Russia is utilizing the states of Central Asia, above all Kazakhstan, as a key channel for circumventing Western sanctions imposed after February 2022. This contains the parallel import of dual-use items, re-exports and monetary operations. Regardless of the blocking of main Russian banks from the SWIFT system and comparable mechanisms, these establishments proceed to take part within the lending and financing of tasks in Kazakhstan via native subsidiaries and intermediaries (The Diplomat, “Rising Russian Agency Takes Place of Sanctioned Lender in Central Asia”, 21 December 2024)
In keeping with Western analysts, the amount of re-exports of critically necessary items (microelectronics, CNC machine instruments, optics) from Kazakhstan to Russia in 2023–2025 elevated by 35–48 per cent in contrast with pre-sanctions ranges, as confirmed by EAEU customs statistics and US intelligence experiences. Kazakhstan stays essentially the most handy route because of the absence of inside customs controls throughout the EAEU, its well-developed logistics infrastructure and the potential of utilizing third currencies—primarily the Chinese language yuan—for settlements (Lansing Institute, “Kazakhstan as Russia’s Sanctions Evasion Hub: 2025 Replace”, December 2025). As well as, a big position is performed by cryptocurrency schemes and nominal corporations registered in Kazakhstan’s free financial zones, which make it potential to obscure the ultimate recipient of products.
In 2025–2026, throughout the framework of the nineteenth sanctions bundle, the EU launched transaction bans towards sure Kazakh banks (together with VTB Financial institution Kazakhstan), in addition to banks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for facilitating sanctions evasion. Comparable measures are being mentioned within the context of the twentieth bundle (Council of the European Union, press launch “nineteenth bundle of sanctions towards Russia”, 23 October 2025: The Diplomat, “Extra Central Asian Banks Sanctioned by the EU”, 24 October 2025).
The Kazakh authorities formally deny systematic help to Russia and have strengthened export controls, which led to frame delays and a discount within the re-export of sanctioned items by 18–22 per cent within the first quarter of 2026. Nonetheless, the dangers of secondary sanctions stay. In January 2026, President Tokayev publicly said that “Kazakhstan is not going to grow to be a bypass route for violating worldwide legislation” (Kazinform, “Tokayev: Kazakhstan is not going to be used to bypass sanctions”, 15 January 2026). In observe, nevertheless, the continued excessive degree of commerce with Russia (greater than 20 per cent of Kazakhstan’s overseas commerce turnover) creates goal difficulties for a whole severance of such chains.
Worldwide commodity merchants Glencore and Trafigura keep a big presence within the area. Glencore is negotiating the sale of its 70 per cent stake in Kazzinc to an area businessman, Shakhmurat Mutalip (estimated worth of the deal: USD 4–4.5 billion); the corporate may present financing (Bloomberg, “Kazakh Constructing Tycoons Pivot to Mining as Energy Shifts”, 27 November 2025; Mining.com, “Glencore stated to shut in on sale of Kazzinc mining operations”, 19 February 2026).
Trafigura continues to function with Kazakh mining property and, via joint ventures with native corporations, provided gear and financed tasks value greater than USD 800 million in 2025. Formally, these transactions don’t fall beneath direct sanctions towards Russia; nevertheless, their profitability and oblique hyperlinks to Russian pursuits enable financial flows beneficial to sanctioned constructions to be maintained (Reuters, “Trafigura expands Kazakhstan metals buying and selling amid Russia sanctions”, 12 March 2026). As well as, Trafigura is actively concerned in metals buying and selling via Kazakh intermediaries, which permits circumvention of restrictions on direct provides from Russia.
The Kazakh authorities have repeatedly said that the nation’s territory should not be used to bypass sanctions and have tightened transaction checks. Nonetheless, the expansion of secondary dangers has already led to an extension of cost phrases to 45–60 days and the introduction of extra compliance procedures for all EAEU counterparties. This creates extra financial prices for Kazakh companies and reduces the nation’s attractiveness as a transit hub.
In contrast to Kazakhstan, a lot of Central Asian states (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) have launched stricter restrictions on the penetration of enormous Russian enterprise and pay shut consideration to figures with pronounced political ties, together with Alisher Usmanov. Such measures are aimed toward minimising the dangers of secondary sanctions and sustaining a steadiness in relations with the West (International Coverage Analysis Institute, “The Impression of Russia Sanctions on Central Asia”, December 2024). Uzbekistan, for instance, revoked a number of OFAC common licences for transactions involving Russian property after 2022 and launched extra checks for Russian buyers. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan went even additional, just about closing entry to strategic sectors for sanctioned entities.
Specific consideration needs to be paid to the actions of younger Kazakh businessmen who’re intently built-in into Russian elite circles. Shakhmurat Mutalip (35, proprietor of Integra Development KZ and President of the Boxing Federation of the Republic of Kazakhstan) is actively growing tasks in building and mining. In keeping with media experiences, he’s looking for to amass stakes in Kazzinc (Glencore) and as much as 40 per cent of Eurasian Sources Group (ERG, estimated at round USD 1.4 billion). His private ties with the administration of VTB and Sberbank have additionally been reported, which, based on specialists, might create channels of affect extending past purely industrial relations (The Insider, “Eurasian Sources Group might lose its OFAC licence…”, 13 January 2026; MK Kazakhstan, “Who’s Shakhmurat Mutalip and why is his title linked to Russian banks”, 5 February 2026).
Mutalip, who beforehand targeted on railway and motorway building, sharply expanded his presence in mining in 2025–2026 by registering new corporations on the Astana Worldwide Monetary Centre (KazZinc Group Ltd and Central Asia Sources Holding Ltd). In keeping with analysts, these steps mirror not solely industrial pursuits but in addition a possible position as a proxy for Russian monetary and industrial teams (Bloomberg, “Glencore Mentioned to Shut In on Sale of Kazzinc Mining Operations”, 19 February 2026).
Historic precedents (Mukhtar Ablyazov in Kazakhstan and the enterprise constructions of the Viktor Yanukovych period in Ukraine) show a typical trajectory: an preliminary give attention to industrial tasks, adopted by a transition to financing political forces and events. Given the Kremlin’s long-term technique of integrating the post-Soviet area, it will be advisable for the Kazakh authorities to use enhanced due diligence to such proxy figures, notably in strategic sectors (George W. Bush Presidential Heart, “Strategic Corruption: Russia in Europe and Central Asia”, December 2025).
Total, the tightening of EU and US secondary sanctions in 2025–2026 (together with new restrictions on third nations beneath the twentieth bundle) is making sanctions-evasion schemes more and more expensive and dangerous. For Kazakhstan, sustaining its repute as a dependable associate requires additional strengthening of compliance controls, diversification of overseas financial relations and enhanced monitoring of proxy constructions intently linked to Russian elites. It is suggested to develop a nationwide technique to minimise the dangers of secondary sanctions, together with the creation of a specialised regulatory physique to supervise re-exports and overseas funding in strategic sectors, in addition to deeper cooperation with the EU and the USA inside early-warning mechanisms. Solely such an method will enable Kazakhstan to protect the financial advantages of regional integration with out undermining the long-term sovereignty and worldwide repute of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
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